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1 Introduction 
Macro-labour models often assume equal shifts in labour demand and wage setting in 
response to productivity changes, and embrace the notion that productivity gains are 
fully translated into wage rises that offset employment creation. Conventional wisdom 
asserts that if the long-run elasticity of wages with respect to labour productivity is 
unity, the labour income share is constant in the steady state and, thus, neutral to the 
performance of labour markets. (Hereafter, productivity refers to labour productivity.) 
Contrary to the above, in this paper we argue that productivity growth determines 
the labour income share in the long run, and the labour share is a driving force of labour 
demand. This is a result of frictional growth, a phenomenon generated by the interplay 
of labour market frictions and growth. 
In the context of our analysis it is important to acknowledge that the labour income 
share, since it can be expressed as the ratio of average real wage and productivity, is 
equivalent to the wage-productivity gap:1 
wages wages/employees avg. wage 
labour share ≡ GDP = GDP/employees = productivity ≡ wage gap. (1) 
If, say, a 10% productivity gain is accompanied by a 10% growth in the average real wage, 
then the wage gap is zero. However, the lower the wage growth, the more wages trail 
productivity gains and thus the higher is the wage gap. 
Although the idea that productivity slowdowns decrease employment because they 
widen the gap between the real wage and productivity has been revived in recent years 
(e.g. Ball and Mankiw, 2002, Ball and Moffitt, 2002, Hatton, 2007), the contribution of 
this study is to show that a permanent increase in the growth rate of productivity has 
permanent (rather than transitory) effects on employment due to frictional growth. The 
interplay of lags and growth in the wage setting process implies that the growth of ‘wage 
aspirations’ does not eventually catch up with productivity growth. 
This contribution has a twofold dimension. First, whilst maintaining the assumption 
of a unitary long-run elasticity of wages with respect to productivity, we show that in a 
dynamic wage-setting equation with growing variables productivity growth affects wages 
in the long run. Second, in the light of this result (i.e. that the wage gap depends 
negatively on productivity growth), we consider a stylised labour demand equation and 
demonstrate that one implication of frictional growth is that the labour share (or wage 
gap) affects employment at all time horizons. This is shown analytically in Section 3 and 
subsequently quantified empirically. 
In several studies of the OECD economies, the relatively high labour shares and un-
1Further, note the intricate association of the labour share to the (real) unit labour cost; the latter is 
defined as the average (real) cost of labour per unit of real output. 
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employment rates witnessed in the 1970s were attributed to wage demands which were 
perceived to be higher than the wage warranted by productivity growth.2 In this strand of 
literature, ‘real wage rigidity’ refers to the reluctance of workers to match a slowdown in 
productivity with a slowdown in actual wages. Under the widely accepted view that the 
growth of real wages is driven by the growth of productivity in the long run, a mismatch 
between wage aspirations and productivity growth violates fundamentals and thus leads 
to higher unemployment. 
However, to argue that workers have been demanding too high wages after the end of 
the 1970s would be a mere contradiction of reality. As Ball and Mankiw (2002, p. 129-130) 
put it “This story received attention in the early 1980s and then faded from prominence. 
... Today’s version of the story reverses the signs. Productivity has accelerated but 
workers have become accustomed to the slow wage growth since the 1970s.” Figure 1 
clearly shows that wages have been trailing productivity over the past thirty years and, 
on average, the labour share has been on a downward slope. 
The downward trend of the labour share after the 1970s shifted the focus away from the 
wage-productivity growth mismatch as a determinant of unemployment, towards that of 
the role of labour market institutions. This was epitomised by the influential 1994 OECD 
Jobs Study which argued that, while wage-push factors (such as unemployment benefits, 
firing restrictions, minimum wages, union power, and the tax wedge) are responsible for 
the rise in unemployment, active labor market policies can reduce it. Note that this point 
of view is in the line of the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), LNJ, contribution to 
the literature. LNJ develop a model in a Cobb-Douglas framework which, as we show in 
Section 3, implies a constant labour share that is neutral to employment. 
This paper challenges the established view of treating the labour income share as 
innocuous to employment and, instead, investigates its impact on the evolution of em-
ployment. To substantiate the analytical exposition of Section 3, we provide empirical 
models of wage setting and employment equations for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Spain, the UK, and the US (i.e. the G7 countries, where Spain has substituted Canada)3 
using annual data over the 1960-2008 period. Our findings show that the time-varying 
labour share of these countries has significantly affected their employment trajectories 
across decades. This indicates that the evolution of the wage-productivity gap should 
play an instrumental role in policy making. 
While a constant labour share restraints economic reasoning simply into a demand-
and supply-side settlement, a time-varying wage gap ignites the distributional aspect of 
macro-labour policies as well. 
2Grubb, Jackman and Layard (1982), and Bruno and Sachs (1985) are among the influential papers. 
3Or the European G5 group plus US and Japan (Blanchard, 2006, p. 15). 
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Figure 1 . Labour income shares 
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Put differently, a constant labour share focuses on the battle of the markups and leaves 
the conquest of the pie in obscurity. Although an investigation of the reason(s) that 
keep workers ‘accustomed’4 to lower labour shares is beyond the scope of this study, we 
endeavor to address the issue of the labour share effects on the income distribution in 
future work. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the evolution of 
the labour share and briefly comments on income inequality. Section 3 analyses frictional 
growth and illustrates the impact of the wage gap on employment through a stylised model 
of wage setting and labour demand equations. Section 4 gives data sources, variable de-
finitions, and outlines the econometric methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical 
results, and Section 6 presents the dynamic contributions of the labour share to employ-
ment. Section 7 concludes and gives suggestions for future work. 
2 A Bird’s Eye View of the Labour Share 
To set the stage of our study, we give a summary description of the time series charac-
teristics of the labour income shares and briefly discuss some associated developments 
in the economic background. Although widely assumed in the literature, the theoretical 
property of a constant labour share is strongly refuted by reality. The plots in Figure 
1 show that, on average, the labour share has evolved along a downward path over the 
past five decades in all of the seven countries we examined (as explained in Section 4, the 
labour share is adjusted for self-employment income). 
Table 1 presents this picture in a nutshell by recording the highest value attained by 
each country, the end of sample value, and the difference between the two. The disparity 
between the top value of the labour share and its end of sample (2008) values observed 
in each country is in the range of 7.7 and 16.2 percentage points. Japan in 1975 had the 
highest labour share of 82.10%, while Italy in 2001 witnessed the lowest value of 55.84%. 
These two countries (and to a lesser degree France) exhibit a relatively wide range of 
labour share values, almost double the size of the other four countries. 
Table 1 . Summary information for labour income shares 
France Germany Italy Japan Spain UK US 
78.76 
(1981) 
65.71 
13.05 
71.12 
(1974) 
62.26 
8.86 
72.41 
(1964) 
57.36 
15.05 
82.10 
(1975) 
65.91 
16.19 
69.48 
(1976) 
60.98 
8.5 
77.29 
(1975) 
69.61 
7.68 
72.23 
(1961) 
62.85 
9.38 
Top value (%) 
(year) 
2008 value (%) 
Top-2008 (pp) 
As shown in Table 1 and Figure 1, the evolution of the UK labour share is quite 
distinctive: it features the least wide range of labour share values, and it is quite volatile. 
4To use the phrase of Ball and Mankiw (2002, p. 130). 
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On the other hand, surprisingly so, the overall picture of Germany resembles that of the 
US as the labour shares in both countries are characterised by rather smooth t ime paths 
and a similar range of values. Nevertheless, i n Section 6 we show that there are significant 
differences between the labour share changes of the two countries in each decade and their 
concomitant employment contributions. Also, note that some countries experienced an 
accelerated reduction in the their labour share dur ing some periods, i n the sense that the 
labour share was fall ing by more than one percentage point (pp) per year. For example, 
the labour share drop in France was 10.53 pp f rom 1981 to 1989 (slope=-1.32);5 in Spain 
the drop was 6 pp f rom 1981 to 1986 (slope=-1.2); i n the U K the labour share fell by 
6.97 pp dur ing 1991-97 (slope=-1.16); and in I ta ly i t fell by 5.41 pp over the first half of 
the nineties (slope=-1.08). Furthermore, the Spanish labour share apparently displays a 
downward shift in its regime f rom the eighties onwards. We revisit the evolution of these 
labour shares in Section 6, where we focus on the wage gap changes in each decade and 
examine their employment contributions. 
Recent l i terature has identified three interrelated factors as responsible for the decline 
in the labour shares: globalisation, technological progress, and product and labour market 
policies. The mechanisms through which compensation and job creation grow at a rate 
slower than economic growth are, among others, trade shares and terms-of-trade prices, 
foreign direct investment, offshoring, migrat ion flows, and financial openness ( IMF , 2007). 
I n addit ion, technological progress tends to increase returns to capital and, thus, the 
capital income share. I n tu rn , i n seeking to maintain competitiveness, the product and 
labour market policies typical ly undertaken have tended to weaken the bargaining posit ion 
of labour vis-à-vis the firm (Bentoli la and Saint-Paul, 2003; Bental and Demouguin, 2010). 
Given that the labour share represents the part of the economic pie that goes to 
labour, rather than profits, distr ibut ional issues at the core of this concept remain intact 
whether we call i t labour income share (wage share) or wage-productivity gap (real uni t 
labour cost). I t is important to highlight that the downward sloping trajectory of the 
labour share has been accompanied by a worsening income inequality. The latter has 
been documented by a variety of authors in bo th the academia and the press. 
I n their investigation of wealth and income inequality i n the US in 1982-2000, Wolff 
and Zacharias (2006) evidence a gain of 9.5 percentage points in the income share of 
the top decile ( from 33.4% to 42.9%). This increase in the share of the top decile is in 
stark contrast to the losses in the share of the aggregate economic pie experienced by 
the percentiles in the bo t tom 90 percent of the income distr ibut ion. The inequality gap 
is further magnified when we look at the very high end of the distr ibut ional spectrum: 
the share of the top percentile increased f rom 9.9 % to a staggering 17.4%. These results 
are in line w i t h Piketty and Saez (2006) who find that dur ing the 20th century the top 
5
 A slope < - 1 means that the reduction rate exceeded 1 pp per year over a given period. 
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percentile has fluctuated from around 18% before WWI, to only around 8% in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and back to around 17% by 2000. 
In Japan, traditionally considered as an egalitarian society, inequality has been rising 
since the eighties. Moriguchi (2010, p. 7) links this increase “with a faster growth of wage 
income at the high end of the distribution”. He also states (p. 23) that the recent increases 
in the top 1% wage group are modest when compared to those in the US. Regarding the 
rich-poor divide in the UK, it is wider now than 40 years ago according to the report of 
the National Equality Panel: An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK, January 
2010.6 
Furthermore, Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) examine inequality among world 
citizens using data from 1820 to 1992 and find that, while the income share of the top 
decile was relatively stable about 50 percent throughout the 1950s to the 1970s, it started 
increasing in 1980, reaching its highest value of 53.4 percent in 1992 (ibid, Table 1, p. 
731-732.) Edward (2006), using density and growth curves, presents a holistic analysis 
of global poverty, growth, and inequality. Among his findings is that the “poorest half 
of the world’s population received less that one-tenth of the global growth in the 1990s.” 
(p. 1677); furthermore, for the middle-income earners outside China (roughly one billion 
people between the 50th and 70th percentiles), consumption hardly changed from 1993 
to 2001. 
Among others, in the Financial Times we read that “Between 2000 and 2006 the US 
economy expanded by 18 per cent, whereas real income for the median working class 
dropped by 1.1 per cent ... Meanwhile, the top tenth saw an improvement of 32 per cent 
in their incomes, the top 1 per cent a rise of 203 per cent the top 0.1 per cent a staggering 
gain of 425 per cent.”7 The Economist reports that, since 2000, “The fruits of productivity 
gains have been skewed towards the highest earners, and towards companies, whose profits 
have reached record levels as a share of GDP.”8 Wo l ff and Zacharias (2006, p. 5) note that 
in 2004, the median net worth of the individuals in the Forbes 400 list was $1.5 billion 
“as compared to the median net worth of $93,000 for all other households.” According to 
Llense (2010, p. 1) “the sharp increase in globalization and the last privatization wave 
have promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France.” 
As the increase in the share of the top percentile has been accompanied by the ex-
ceptional growth in top executives’ pay relative to the salaries of employees, the issue of 
whether the so called "working rich"9 have replaced top capital owners (the "rentiers") 
6See also the Joseph Rowntree Foundation “New poverty and wealth maps of Britain reveal inequality 
to be at 40-year high”, 17 July 2007, www.jrf.org.uk. 
7Financial Times, 29/10/2008, Stuck in the Middle by Edward Luce. 
8The Economist, 2006, June 17, Special report: Inequality in America. 
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“Fo r be s popularised this term. However, the magazine used it in the sense that the wealthiest 
Americans hold jobs rather than in the sense that the wealthiest depend mainly on labour income as 
their chief source of income.” (Wolff and Zacharias, 2006, p. 12). 
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at the top of the economic ladder is open to debate.10 Economists of the Washington 
consensus have labelled such a wealth redistribution ‘median wage stagnation’ and are 
stunned about the complexity of the problem and its causes. Others dub it the ‘silent 
recession’.11 
We view globalisation as a phenomenon that encapsulates (among other things) the in-
terplay of technological progress and product/labour market policies in a world of growing 
inequality. From the above statistics and selected literature, it is apparent that globali-
sation leads to higher employment, whilst it is accompanied by a more unequal income 
distribution. Given that the boost in employment is one side of the globalisation coin, 
and its flip side is the worsening of inequality, the labour share is the footprint of the 
globalised employment/income inequality mix (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Anatomy of the labour share channel 
Globalization ^v ( + Employment 
/ \ ) ' = > ( ' + L a b o u r share J^^ 
^Technological Product/Labour / \ . - ^ ^ " ^ ^ A Income 
progress Market pol ic ies/ C T 
3 The Impact of the Labour Share on Employment 
Conventional labour market analysis asserts that the labour share is constant and neutral 
to employment. The property of constancy stems from the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas 
(CD) production function, whereas employment neutrality arises from the perception that 
the steady state of the wage curve coincides with its long-run solution. We argue that 
the steady-state and long-run versions of wage setting are identical in the absence of 
dynamics and growth. We call the interplay between dynamics and growth frictional 
growth and show that it is responsible for the disparity between the steady-state and 
long-run solutions of dynamic equations. 
In what follows, we iterate on our viewpoint through the analysis of static/dynamic 
versions of stylised wage and employment equations. The use of such stylised models is 
encouraged by Blanchard (2009, p. 225-226) who ends his review on the ‘state of macro’ 
with three “hopes/pleas”, among which are “the rehabilitation of partial equilibrium mod-
eling” and “the relegalization of shortcuts and simple models... Approximating complex 
relations by simple ones helps intuition and communication.” 
10Fo r e x a m p l e , Wo l ff and Zacharias (2006) do not support this issue, whereas Piketty and Saez (2006) 
argue in its favour. 
11Financial Times, 29/10/2008, Stuck in the Middle by Edward Luce. 
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3.1 Wage Setting vis-à-vis Product iv i ty 
3.1.1 A S t a t i c W a g e C u r v e 
One of the simplest ways to formulate the wage curve is to assume a Nash bargaining 
process, where employees receive an average compensation in exchange of their work and 
firms obtain the average product less the average compensation ( in case of an individual 
negotiation the reference would be the marginal product): 
n =(w) (j--w) , (2) 
where 7 and (1 - 7) are, respectively, the workers’ and the firms’ bargaining power, W 
is the real wage, Y denotes real output and N is employment. Maximisat ion of equation 
(2) involves the first-order condit ion 
^ = 7 (w) -1 (^ - w\1_7 - (1 - 7)(w) (^ -wY =0, 
which gives 
W = j ^ - or 7 = ^ = labour share. (3) 
Note that equation (3) implies a constant labour share and a one-to-one relationship 
between wages and product iv i ty ( in logs). This is the famil iar neoclassical wor ld picture, 
where higher product iv i ty is reflected ful ly i n higher real wages. 
3.1.2 W a g e D y n a m i c s a n d F r i c t i o n a l G r o w t h 
The introduct ion of wage dynamics distorts the above neoclassical d ic tum (at least) in 
the short run. Let us consider that wages do not adjust ful ly to product iv i ty movements 
in the context of a stylised wage-setting equation: 
wt = aw-! +(1 - at) prt, (4) 
where wt denotes log real wage, prt is labour product iv i ty ( in logs), and the autoregressive 
parameter is 0 < ax < 1. Higher order lags, other explanatory variables (i.e. unemploy-
ment and wage-push factors, such as benefits and union power), and the error term are 
ignored for analytical convenience. The static form of wage setting can be thought of as 
arising f rom the naive Nash bargain described in the previous section, or f rom the max-
imisation of a more elaborate Nash bargain in the context of a CES product ion funct ion 
(Manning, 1993, equation (21)). 
The dynamics in the real wage equation (4) may arise f rom wage/price staggering 
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(Taylor, 1979, 1980), or wage aspirations (i.e. wages that workers consider fair). For 
example, Bal l and Moff i t t (2002) consider the possibil ity that a product iv i ty shift is not 
matched immediately by a shift in wage aspirations, because these par t ly depend on past 
wage increases. Alternatively, wage dynamics can be seen as the reconciliation of “the 
empirical Phillips-curve relation and the theoretical wage-curve relation” (Blanchard and 
Katz, 1999, p. 69). I n particular, Blanchard and Katz consider the ‘wage curve’ of 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), which represents a negative relation between real wage 
and unemployment given the reservation wage and productivi ty, and incorporate into i t 
the l ikely dependence of the reservation wage on lagged wage. 
We should point out that the dynamic wage-setting (4) is i n line w i t h the dominant 
view that real wages are t ied closely to labour product iv i ty in the long run. For example, 
Galí (2010) derives a theoretical model where “g is the rate of growth of product iv i ty 
(and real wages) in the steady state” (p. 8); the model presented by Bal l and Moff i t t 
(2002) has the “feature that product ivi ty, real wages, and real-wage aspirations all grow 
at the same rate i n a steady state” (p. 3, nber w8421); and Bal l and Mankiw (2002, p. 
129) argue that “ I n a steady state w i t h constant growth of labor product ivi ty, the growth 
of real wages is determined by the growth of productivi ty, as suggested by neoclassical 
theory (and empirical evidence).” 
Put differently, the salient characteristic of the real wage equation (4) is a uni tary 
long-run elasticity of wages w i t h respect to productivi ty. This becomes apparent when 
we rewrite i t as 
wt= Wt - ^^Awt , (5) 
‘ t rend’ or steady-state ' v ' 
‘cycle’ if long-run growth = 0 
‘ f r ic t ional growth’ otherwise 
where A is the first difference operator. Taking first differences, and assuming that 
the growth rate of product iv i ty stabilises in the long run , we obtain the neoclassical 
benchmark: 
AwLR = AprLR, (6) 
where the superscript LR denotes the long-run value of the variable. Bal l and Mankiw 
(2002, p. 129) state that “ I n a steady state w i t h constant growth of labor productivi ty, 
the growth of real wages is determined by the growth of product ivi ty, as suggested by 
neoclassical theory (and empirical evidence).” The above result is also “a standard equa-
t ion for price inf lat ion” in Bal l and Moff i t t (2002, equation (4)). I n addit ion, the uni t 
long-run elasticity of real wage w i t h respect to product iv i ty is a feature of the real wage 
model in Hat ton (2007, equation (1), p. 480). 
Finally, observe that the first term of the real wage equation (5) is the ‘trend’ of wt, 
while the second term captures the fr ict ional growth of the model. I f product iv i ty does 
10 
not grow in the long run, the real wage w i l l stabilise in the long run. I n this case fr ict ional 
growth is zero and the second term of equation (5) describes the ‘cyclical’ component of 
real wages. As can be seen f rom equations (5)-(6), the long-run state of wage setting is 
decomposed into the steady-state solution and fr ict ional growth: 
WLR= LR+ ( ^ } A LR\ (7) 
long-run state steady-state \ ~ « i 
frictional growth 
I t is important to note that the long-run elasticity of the real wage w i t h respect to 
product iv i ty is uni ty regardless of whether fr ict ional growth is zero or not. We believe that 
the focus of economists on elasticities has led them to generally disregard the phenomenon 
of fr ict ional growth, i.e. the interplay between lags and growth, i n macro-labour models. 
However, i t needs to be stressed that fr ict ional growth arises under the plausibi l i ty of a 
dynamically growing environment (for example, one in which product iv i ty grows). 
3.2 Labour Demand 
3.2.1 C o b b - D o u g l a s a n d Fac to r Shares 
Let us consider the following C D production function: 
Y = AN^K?, or ^ = A (^ J , (8) 
where K is capital stock, A is technology, and f3 (0 < f3 < 1) accounts for the relative 
influence of capital and employment on output . 
The maximisation problem is 
m a x l l = AN1-?^ - WN - rK, 
where I I denotes profits, the price of labour is the real wage (W) and the price of K is 
the real rental price proxied by the real interest rate ( r ) . 
The first-order condit ion (FOC) w i t h respect to labour, §2 = 0, gives 
(l-P)AK?N-?-W = 0 ^ 
K 
N 
Substi tut ing equation (8) into (9), we obtain 
8 
(l-f3)AIp = W. (9) 
(l-/3)^ = W or ( 1 - = labour share. (10) 
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I n other words, profi t maximisation under a C D production function scheme implies a 
constant labour income share.12 
Similarly to the derivation of the labour share (10), algebraic manipulat ion of the FOC 
w i t h respect to capital, f j * = 0, gives the following capital share (also a constant): 
/ 3 j ^ = r or f3 = ^ = capital share. (11) 
Note that in a competit ive economy I I = 0 ==*• Y = WN + rK, product ion is thus 
distr ibuted according to the marginal products of its factors and, naturally, the constant 
labour and capital shares add up to one. 
We should point out that Blanchard (2006) calls the profit maximising wage the ‘war-
ranted wage’, the wage set in bargaining the ‘bargained wage’, and argues that “If, for 
given labour market conditions, the bargained wage grows faster than the warranted 
wage, equi l ibr ium employment w i l l decline...” ( ibid, p. 13-14.) I n the context of the 
above profit maximisation framework and the bargaining process (2), this means that 
employment stabi l i ty is achieved when the ‘warranted wage’ (10) equals the ‘bargained 
wage’ (3): 
1 - / 3 = 7. (12) 
A bargained wage growing faster that the warranted one, 7 > 1 - / 3 , leads to lower 
employment and a higher natural rate of unemployment. 
Next, the labour demand can be obtained by expressing the first-order condit ion (9) 
in terms of employment: 
(l-a)AKaW~1 = Na => N=[(l-a)A]1/aKW-1/a. (13) 
Thus, in logarithms: 
IniV = - l n ( l - a ) + - l nA + l n ^ - - l n ^ i.e. (14) 
a a a 
labour demand = / (technological change, capital, real wage) . 
I n their essay on the Cambridge controversies, Cohen and Harcourt (2003, p. 199) set 
the stage of the historical debates on capital theory w i t h Joan Robinson’s complaint: “... 
the production function has been a powerful instrument of miseducation. The student of 
economic theory is ... instructed to assume al l workers alike, and ... is to ld something 
about the index-number problem in choosing a uni t of output ; then he is hurried on to 
the next question, in the hope that he w i l l forget to ask i n what units K is measured. 
12
 Clearly, the labour share wil l not remain constant without assuming a CD production function. For 
example, Manning (1993, p. 104), in the context of maximising a Nash bargain, uses a CES technology 
and derives a time-varying share of labour in output. 
12 
Before he ever does ask, he has become a professor, and so sloppy habits of thought are 
handed on f rom one generation to the next.” 
As far as our understanding of labour markets is concerned, we hold the view that 
although the workings of the CD product ion funct ion offer useful analytical insight, its 
l imitat ions are profound and should not be discounted. 
3.2.2 E m p l o y m e n t v is -à -v is t h e W a g e G a p 
Let us consider the following standard log-linear labour demand equation: 
nt = 0 0 + 0 ^ . 1 - (j)2wt + (p3prt + "other variables" + et, (15) 
where nt denotes employment and the 0’s are positive parameters; the autoregressive 
parameter is 0 < ^ < 1 captures employment adjustment costs, such as costs of h i r ing 
and firing, search costs, and t ra in ing costs. The explanatory set may include variables 
like the real interest rates or real balances, and financial wealth (see Section 5). We 
should point out that , i n the l ight of the labour demand equation (14) obtained by the 
CD framework, product iv i ty (pr) can be thought of as capturing technological change. 
(This is common in the l i terature - see, for example, Blanchard, 2006.) 
Similarly to wage setting above, higher order lags, "other variables" and the str ict 
white noise error term, et, are ignored wi thout loss of generality. Also, for expositional 
simplicity, we assume that 03 = 02 and (ignoring other variables and the error term) we 
wr i te: 
nt = (p0 + $1nt_1 - 02 (wt - prt) , (16) 
Note that the log difference between the real wage and product iv i ty is a key element in the 
unemployment rate equation (2) used by (Hatton, 2007), which can also be thought of as a 
dynamic labour demand equation (p. 480). We can further just i fy the stylised employment 
equation (15) or (16) in the words of Blanchard (2009, p. 222) “Small models are essential 
communication and exposition devices. When successful, they reduce a complex issue to 
its essence. They can either embody the wisdom of larger, more explicit microfounded 
models...” 
First differencing of equation (16), and the use of equation (6), shows that the long-
run/steady-state employment growth is zero: 
AnLR = - 2 (AwLR - AprLR) =0. (17) 
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Furthermore, the employment equation (16) can be reparameterised as 
nt = — (wt - vrt) ^ A n , (18) 
H
 1 - ^ (l~Cp1) P 1-01 
Observe that , since the last term of equation (18) vanishes in the long run (due to equation 
(17)), we obtain the following long-run labour demand function: 
LR _ 0 02 (V1LR _ rrrLR\ ~\Q 
" 1 - 0 1 (1 - 01) { P () 
0 02«1 LR 
+ ^Pr 1 - 0 1 ( l - « 1 ) ( l - 0 1 ) 
I n the l ight of the analysis of wage dynamics and fr ict ional growth in equation (5), 
the above implies that the wage-productivity gap plays an influential role in employment 
dynamics at al l t ime horizons. I n particular, the long-run state (19) of labour demand 
shows that the wage gap has a long-run effect on employment due to fr ict ional growth 
in wage setting. The labour share cannot affect long-run employment under the rather 
implausible assumptions that product iv i ty ceases to grow in the long run and the real 
wage is independent of past wage-setting decisions. 
3.3 Implication of Frictional Growth 
To enhance our understanding of the phenomenon of fr ict ional growth, we i l lustrate (wi th-
out loss of generality) its workings w i th in a "user-friendly" labour market framework. As 
in the previous sections, we follow the dominant view in the l i terature, i.e. we assume a 
uni tary long-run elasticity of wages w i t h respect to productivi ty. For expositional ease, 
and in line w i t h conventional wisdom, we first present the steady-state equations of wage 
setting (WS) and labour demand (LD):13 
steady-state WS : w = pr + n + (impact of exogenous x), (20) 
steady-state LD : n = -w + pr + (impact of exogenous z). (21) 
To keep algebraic and geometric simplicity we further assume that the elasticity of wage 
setting w i t h respect to employment and the wage elasticity of labour demand are equal to 
uni ty in absolute value. Note that , while the inclusion of employment as an explanatory 
variable of real wages (20) describes an environment of imperfect competi t ion (and/or 
information), the wage setting equation (4) prevails under perfect competi t ion. The 
efficiency-wage and insider-outsider l i terature have shown that there is a positive relation 
13
 Note that while the exogenous set of variables x and z are important for the identification of the WS 
and LD schedules, they play no role in the analysis below and are thus ignored. 
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between wages and employment. The analysis of the above prototype real wage and 
employment equations is also portrayed in Figure 3 below. The 45° downward-sloping 
WS and upward-sloping LD schedules intersect at point E, which determines the in i t ia l 
equi l ibr ium values of employment and real wage, n and w, respectively. 
Now suppose that product iv i ty increases by one uni t to a new level, pr'. This causes the 
wage curve to shift to the left at the WS' schedule, and labour demand to shift to the r ight 
at the LD' schedule. Both shifts, which are parallel and of the same size, §£ = §^ = 1, are 
pictured in Figure 3 by the distance EE'. The intersection point E' between wage setting 
(WS') and labour demand (LD') determines the new equi l ibr ium values of employment 
and real wage, ri and w'. I t is clear that , while the rise in product iv i ty leads to a wage 
rise of the same magnitude in the steady state, w' - w = pr' - pr = E'E = 1, i t produces 
no change i n employment, ri = n. This is because i n equations (20)-(21) product iv i ty 
gains are ful ly translated into wage rises that offset employment creation. 
This is not the case in an economy characterised by dynamics and long-run growth. 
To show this we modify the labour market equations (20)-(21) by introducing an autore-
gressive element in each of them, while keeping the same steady-state solutions: 
WS : wt = awt_1 +(l-a)prt +(l-a)nt, (22) 
LD : nt = <fmt_1-(l-(f>)wt +(l-(f>)prt, (23) 
where 0 < a-,0 < 1 denote the autoregressive parameters. Let us rewrite equations 
(22)-(23) as 
WS : wt=prt + nt — A w t , (24) 
LD : nt = - w t + prt 
1 
r^Ant ' (25) 
where A (•) denotes the growth rate of the variable. 
For expositional ease, let growth i n the above model stem solely f rom productivi ty, 
and assume that the growth rate of product iv i ty stabilises i n the long run, AprLR. I t 
follows that the long-run state of wage setting is 
long-run state WS : w = pr + n —AwLR, 
1 - a 
= pr + n —AprLR, (26) 
1 - a 
since i t can be shown that AwLR = AprLR (equation (6)) is also val id in the above 
dynamic model.14 The long-run state of wage setting (26) is plot ted by the WSLR schedule 
14In the context of dynamic wage setting, the benchmark result suggested by neoclassical theory (and 
empirical evidence), namely that the growth of real wages is determined by the growth of productivity, 
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in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Employment and productivity 
w 
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Observe that in the absence of long-run growth and/or dynamics, the long-run state 
(26) reduces to the steady state (20). Thus the elegant relationship: 
long-run state WS = steady-state WS + Fr ict ional Growth. (27) 
Frictional growth, a long-run phenomenon, encapsulates the interplay of dynamics and 
growth and represents the distance between the WS' and WSLR schedules in Figure 3. 
The intersection point ELR between WSLR and LD' gives the long-run equi l ibr ium values 
of the dynamic labour market model (22)-(23).15 I n the presence of dynamics and growth, 
the rise in product iv i ty to a new level pr' leads to employment creation (nLR > ri), since 
fr ict ional growth implies that product iv i ty gains are not ful ly translated into wage rises. 
is obtained by the first difference of equation (24) 
Awt = Aprt + Ant A2wt 
and (i) the plausible assumption that wage growth stabilises in the long run, i.e. A2wLR = 0, and (ii) 
the simplifying assumption that the only source of long-run growth in the model is productivity (i.e. 
AnLR = 0). In the long run, under these conditions, the above equation reduces to 
AwLR = AprLR. 
15
 Note that under the assumption that productivity is the only source of growth, the long-run state of 
labour demand is equivalent to its steady-state, i.e. the LD' and LDLR schedules coincide. 
a 
1 
16 
4 Empirical Approach 
We should emphasise that our modell ing approach does not fal l into the murky wa-
ters of the theoretical versus data-driven debate, since the real wage and employment 
equations (4)-(15) rely on the bidirectional feedback between a prior viewpoint and the 
observations-driven analysis. Consequently, the a im of our macroeconometric methodol-
ogy is to investigate the symbiotic relationship between theory and evidence, rather than 
compartmentalising them and then bridging the gap between theory and data. Regarding 
the latter, Blanchard (2009, p. 224) argues that “Reconciling the theory w i t h the data 
has led to a lot of unconvincing reverse engineering.” 
4.1 Data and Variable Definitions 
We use annual data f rom the OECD (Economic Outlook, Annual Labour Force Statistics), 
the I M F , and Bloomberg running f rom 1960 to 2008 for France, Germany, I taly, Japan, 
Spain, the U K and US. The variables entering the wage and employment equations are 
shown in Table 2 and are as follows. Employment (n) is the to ta l number of employees 
in logs, the unemployment rate is given by u = I - n, where the force (/) is the log of 
to ta l active populat ion. The set of inst i tut ional variables includes social security benefits 
(b) as a percentage of GDP; trade union density (ud), i.e. the number of wage and salary 
earners that are trade union members over the tota l number of wage and salary earners; 
the min imum wage (wm) relative to the average wage of ful l- t ime workers; and direct 
and indirect taxes (rd, T1) as a percentage of GDP. Depending on the availabil i ty of a 
money supply series, we proxy the rental price of capital by (i) real interest rates ( r ) , 
defined as the difference between the nominal interest rate and the inf lat ion rate (defined 
as the rate of change of the G D P deflator), or (ii) real money balances (rb), defined as a 
broad measure of money supply over the GDP deflator. Financial wealth (fw) captures 
expectations on future product iv i ty (Phelps and Zoega, 2001), and is defined as the log 
of the stock exchange index over the GDP deflator.16 We control for external factors 
through real oi l prices (oil), the degree of economic openness (open) defined as exports 
plus imports over GDP, and a standard measure of competitiveness (comp): the rat io 
of import prices over the GDP deflator ( in logs). Finally, we also use private household 
consumption (c) as percentage of GDP, and the log of working-age populat ion (z). 
Real average wage, labour product ivi ty, and labour income share deserve special at-
tent ion. Empirically, the simple theoretical definit ion (1) of the labour share is affected 
by two measurement issues. First , to ta l labour compensation should include both depen-
dent and self-employment compensation. However, information on to ta l compensation 
16We experimented with this variable in Germany, Spain, the UK, and the US, using the DAX, IGBM 
(Índice General de la Bolsa de Madrid), FTSE, and S&P 500 indices, respectively. 
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supplied by the National Accounts excludes income generated by self-employees and, as 
a consequence, the appropriate measure of the labour income share requires some ad-
justments. Here we follow Gollin (2002) to adjust the labour share for self-employment 
income. Second, the standard measure of ouput is GDP at market prices which, in con-
trast to GDP at factor costs, includes taxes on production and imports, and does not 
include subsidies. Since these taxes and subsidies are not regarded as a component of 
generated income, they need to be excluded from the calculation of the labour income 
share. 
Ta b l e 2 . D e finitions of variables 
Is 
w 
pr 
fw 
rb 
r 
open 
comp 
oil 
c 
labour share {= w - pr) 
average total real compensation 
labour productivity 
financial wealth 
real balances 
real interest rates (%) 
openness (%) 
competitiveness 
real oil prices 
private consumption (% of GDP) 
u 
n 
win 
ud 
T* 
Td 
b 
z 
cnt 
t 
unemployment rate (%) 
employment 
minimum wage (%) 
trade union density (%) 
indirect taxes (% of GDP) 
direct taxes (% of GDP) 
social security benefits (% of GDP) 
working-age population 
constant 
linear time trend 
Note: Variables are in logs unless otherwise indicated. 
Sources: Bloomberg (fw), IMF (oil), and OECD (rest of the variables). 
Given these caveats, we have followed the Ameco methodology17 and computed the 
adjusted labour share as 
total compensation/dependent employment total compensation total employment 
Lo = = 
GDP at factor costs/total employment GDP at factor costs dependent employment 
Once the labour share is computed, we use equation (1) to retrieve the average wage per 
employee (including self-employment) as W = ^ , where N is to ta l employment and Y 
is the standard measure of GDP at market prices. Note that w, n , y, and Is are the log 
counterparts of W, N, Y and LS, and, therefore, the wage-productivity gap, w - pr, is 
effectively the labour share. 
4.2 Econometric Methodology 
We apply the autoregressive distr ibuted lag (ARDL) approach to estimate wage setting 
and labour demand equations for each of the seven countries in our sample. The A R D L 
procedure (also known as bounds testing approach) was developed by Pesaran (1997), 
Pesaran and Shin (1999), and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) as an alternative to the 
popular cointegration/error-correction methodology. The advantage of the A R D L is that 
17http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco. 
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i t is not affected by the pre-testing problem impl ic i t in the standard cointegration tech-
niques (i.e. the Johansen maximum likelihood or the Phillips-Hansen semi-parametric 
ful ly-modif ied OLS procedures). 
The voluminous l i terature on al l the different types of uni t root tests proposed since 
the influential paper by Dickey and Fuller i n Econometrica 1981, is a clear manifestation 
of the problems involved in correctly identifying the order of integration of a t ime series. I t 
can be shown that the A R D L yields consistent short- and long-run estimates irrespective 
of whether the regressors are I(1) or I (0) , and thus i t represents a rigorous econometric 
methodology. 
We determine the dynamic specification of the real wage and employment equations 
by using the opt imal lag-length algor i thm of the Schwartz information criterion. I t is 
important to note that the equations we select are dynamically stable and pass the stan-
dard diagnostic tests at conventional significance levels, i.e. they satisfy the conditions 
of linearity, structural stabil i ty, no serial correlation, homoskedasticity, and normality. I n 
addit ion, we estimate the equations using 2SLS to take into account the issue of endo-
geneity. The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4 below. Note that al l equations are well 
specified, the estimated sensitivities have plausible signs and magnitudes, and the fitted 
values track the actual data very well (see Figure A .1 in the Appendix). 
4.3 Wage Setting Estimations 
The estimations presented in Table 3 are empirical versions of equation (4) that was 
analysed in Section 3. 
Note that the real wage estimations in Table 3 can be associated w i t h the theoretical 
wage-unemployment equation (5), or (6), in Blanchard and Katz (1999), B K hereafter: 
the estimate of the autoregressive parameter, i.e. the coefficient of wt-U can be regarded 
as an estimate of the parameter fi\ in B K , while the estimate of the coefficient of prt, 
the product iv i ty elasticity, corresponds to the B K parameter (1-fiX). Contrary to the 
suggestion by B K (p. 71) that > A = 1 may be a reasonable approximation for the 
Uni ted States”, whereas “ in European countries either fi or A or bo th are significantly less 
than 1” , our estimates of the autoregressive parameter, and thus for the wage elasticity 
of product ivi ty, are: 0.74, 0.70, 0.70, 0.57, 0.56, 0.40 , and 0.15. Nevertheless, the 
US Japan France I ta ly U K Germany Spain 
classical assumption of a one-to-one relationship between real wages and product iv i ty in 
the long run is val id in al l the countries examined. 
Also note that our empirical real wage equation is in line w i t h the model used by 
Hat ton (2007, equation (1)), where real wage depends on its lagged value, labour pro-
duct iv i ty, the unemployment rate and a vector of wage-push variables, and satisfies the 
restriction of a uni tary long-run elasticity w i t h respect to productivi ty. As Hat ton (2007, 
p. 480) argues, this “may be thought of as encompassing the components of the feasible 
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wage, represented by labour productivity, and the target wage, reflected in the negative 
relationship between unemployment and the real wage.” 
Table 3. Wage equations 
France, 1964-2007. 
cnt wt-i prt 
0.70 
[0.000] [0.000] [ * ] 
Vdt bt Ut_X 
wt = 1.18 0.30 0.26 0.94 -0.45 [0.001] [0.004] 
t*lO0 
-0.13 
[0.004] 
Ho- eLw%r l :Wa ld test [X 2 ( l ) ]= 1.09; [0.297] 
[0.005] 
LL = 159.77. 
SC[x2(l)]= 0.06; LIN[x2( l ) ]= 2.08; NOR[x2(2)]= 0.89; HET[x2( l) ]= 0.45; ARCH[x2(l)]= 1.86 
[0.813] [0.150] [0.642] [0.502] [0.173] 
Germany, 1964-2007. 
cnt iy t_! Aiy t_i Awt_3 
wt = 2.41 0.40 0.33 0.29 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
prt udt Audt bt_x rdt 
0.60 0.09 0.29 0.19 0.70 
[ * ] [0.082] [0.016] [0.151] [0.003] 
Ut 
-0.36 
[0.000] 
Aut 
0.74 
[0.000] 
HQ:E LR 
w—pr 
l :Wa ld test [X 2 ( l ) ]= 1.20; 
[0.274] 
LL = 163.95. 
SC[x2(l)]= 0.00; LIN[x2( l ) ]= 0.00; NOR[x2(2)]= 1.65; HET[x2( l) ]= 0.29; ARCH[x2(l)]= 0.13. 
[0.986] [0.968] [0.437] [0.593] [0.715] 
I ta ly , 1962-2007. 
cnt Wt-i prt udt ut opent 
wt = 1.85 0.57 0.43 0.06 -0.47 -0.30 
[0.000] [0.000] [ * ] [0.093] [0.000] [0.000] 
H0:£ LR w—pr l :Wa ld tes t [x 2 ( l ) ] = 2.12; [0.145] LL = 145.66. 
SC[x2(l)]= 0.51; LIN[x2( l ) ]= 0.20; NOR[x2(2)]= 0.87; HET[x2( l) ]= 3.27; ARCH[x2(l)]= 0.04. 
[0.474] [0.657] [0.647] [0.071] [0.836] 
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T a b l e 3 ( c o n t i n u e d ) 
J a p a n , 1962-2008. 
cnt wt-i 
Wt 
H0:£ 
prt udt 
1.07 0.70 0.30 0.74 
[0.000] [0.000] [ * ] [0.000] 
1.25 
[0.000] 
LR 
w—pr l : W a l d test [ X
2 ( l ) ] = 0.48; 
0.53 0.15 
[0.011] [0.095] 
LL = 162.01. 
[0.490] 
SC[x 2 ( l ) ]= 0 .78 ;L IN [x 2 ( l ) ] = 0.16;NOR[x 2 (2) ]= 0 . 9 2 ; H E T [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 1 . 4 6 ; A R C H [ X 2 ( l ) ] = 0.02. 
[0.377] [0.691] [0.630] [0.227] [0.877] 
S p a i n , 1966-2008. 
cnt wt-! A i y t _ i 
wt = 3.56 0.15 0.22 
[0.000] [0.083] [0.023] 
Wt 
0.85 
[ * ] 
h 
0.68 
[0.003] 
wmt 
0.17 
[0.027] 
Ut 
-0.33 
[0.004] 
4 
-1.45 
[0.000] 
A T ! 
1.76 
[0.000] 
H0:e LR w—pr l : W a l d test [ X
2 ( l ) ] = 2.71; 
[0.099] 
LL = 147.37. 
SSC[x2 ( l ) ]= 0.02; L I N [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 0.42; NOR[x2 (2) ]= 0.63; H E T [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 3.07; ARCH[y 2 ( l ) ]=1 .12 . 
[0.888] [0.519] [0.731] [0.080] [0.291] 
U . K . , 1962-2008 . 
Wt 
H0:£ 
cnt wt-! Awt-! wt ™2*-i 
1.83 0.56 0.25 0.44 0.06 
[ * ] [0.000] [0.000] [0.041] 
LR 
w—pr 
l : W a l d t e s t [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 0.13; 
A&t rj cdk 
1.01 0.38 - 0 . 0 1 
[0.005] [0.003] [0.021] [0.000] 
LL = 152.47. 
[0.717] 
SC[x 2 ( l ) ]= 0.01; L I N [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 0.10; NOR[X 2 (2) ]= 1.40; H E T [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 0.07; ARCH[x 2 ( l ) ] = 0.02. 
[0.909] [0.748] [0.497] [0.794] [0.897] 
U.S. , 1962-2007. 
cnt w^ 
IA Wt 
H0:£ 
prt Aprt udt 
1.05 0.74 0.26 0.26 0.16 
[0.017] [0.000] [ * ] [0.032] [0.001] 
LR 
w—pr 
l : W a l d test [ X 2 ( l ) ] = 0.69; 
[0.405] 
LL = 157.75. 
S C [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 1 . 9 5 ; L I N [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 0.79;NOR[x 2 (2) ]= 0 . 3 3 ; H E T [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 1 . 5 0 ; A R C H [ x 2 ( l ) ] = 0.00. 
[0.163] [0.373] [0.848] [0.221] [0.992] 
Note: A denotes the difference operator; p-values in brackets. 
(*) Restricted coefficient for a long-run unit elasticity between wages and productivity: £w_pr LR ^ 
The following observations can be drawn f rom Table 3. First , out of the seven countries 
we examine, wage-push factors have a min imal impact on wage setting in Italy, and a 
minor one in the US. I n particular, (i) the impact of benefits (bt) has the largest value in 
France, followed closely by Japan and Spain, while i t is modest in Germany, non existent 
i n the US and Italy, and w i t h a transient moving-average feature in the UK; (ii) union 
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density (udt) is quite influential in Japan and France, has a minor impact in the US, and 
min imal effects in Germany, I taly, and the UK; (i i i) i n the absence of a union density 
effect i n Spain, the min imum wage factor (wmt) acts as a wage-push factor (albeit w i t h 
a rather small effect). Second, the unemployment rate (ut) does not put any downward 
pressure on real wages in the US, UK , and Japan; in these countries the only downward 
pressure is in the U K f rom the oi l price, oilt. Finally, i n addit ion to unemployment, other 
factors that put downward pressure on wages are openness (opent) in I taly, indirect taxes 
( r j ) in Spain, and a t ime trend in France.18 
4.4 Labour Demand Estimations 
The estimations shown in Table 4 below are empirical versions of the analytical equation 
(15) and feature the following elements. 
The labour share, lst (or wage-productivity gap) affects negatively the employment 
trajectory. Note that bo th the sign and significance of the wage component of the labour 
share conform w i t h the requirements of a typical labour demand equation, while the 
product iv i ty component of the labour share can be seen as embodying the influence of 
capital stock and technical progress on product iv i ty (Manning, 1993, among others). 
I t is worthwhile to summarise the ranking of the countries according to the size of 
the impact of the labour share on employment; the short-run (contemporaneous) and 
long-run sensitivities are reported in Table 5. Japan and France are at the low end of 
the spectrum, Spain is at the high end w i t h a large difference f rom the rest, while I taly, 
Germany, the U K and US are in intermediate terri tory. I t is interesting to note the 
change in the ranking when dynamics are taken into account. A l though Japan remains 
at the low end of the spectrum, Europe’s largest economies (France, U K and Germany) 
follow closely w i t h a long-run sensitivity of around one. Notably, Spain is st i l l at the top 
of the ranking w i t h a value approximately five times higher. The US is r ight at the middle 
- the sensitivity of employment to the labour share (2.2) is twice the size of that i n the 
UK(1.1) , and half the size of that i n Spain (5.0). 
Recall that the dynamic nature of labour demand reflects employment adjustment 
costs and, thus, the first-order autoregressive coefficients in Table 4 indicate the employ-
ment persistence of each country. A l though Italy, Germany, UK , and US share similar 
contemporaneous responses of employment to a change in the labour share (see second 
row in Table 5), they differ substantially in terms of their employment persistence (see 
Table 4, coefficient of n ^ ) : the lowest is i n the U K (0.82), followed by Germany (0.85), 
then the US (0.91), while in I ta ly persistence is as high as 0.95. Clearly, the disparity 
between the ‘short-run’ and ‘long-run’ rankings in Table 5 is associated w i t h the degree 
18
 We view this negative trend as capturing some idiosyncratic features of the French economy for which 
data is not available - possibly related to issues dealing with the importance of public sector employment. 
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of the countries’ employment persistence. In Section 5 we present a detailed evaluation 
of the labour share contributions to the employment time path during each decade. 
Table 4. Employment equations 
France, 1962-2008. 
cnt n t_! lst Arwt Apr^ 
nt = 1.79 0.92 -0.08 -0.33 0.22 
[O.OOl] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.009] 
H0: c(rw) = -c(pr) : Wald test [y2(l)] = 0.10; 
[0.752] 
SC[y2(l)]= 0.00; LIN[y2( l ) ]= 0.01; NOR[y2(2)] 
[0.979] [0.909] 
Germany, 1962-2008. 
cnt m-i A n M lst Aprt 
nt = 2.96 0.85 0.14 -0.18 -0.15 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.004] [0.050] 
rt 
-0.26 
[0.000] 
LL = 
0.27 
[0.000] 
1.77.96. 
= 0.13; HET[v2(l) 
[0.937] 
0.20 
[0.011] 
ft 
-0.19 
[0.008] 
1 = 0.97: 
[0.324] 
fu>t 
0.02 
[0.000] 
Ct 
0.38 
[0.000] 
ARCH 
Afwt 
-0.01 
[0.037] 
Act 
-0.65 
[0.000] 
[y2( l ) ]= 0.39. 
[0.534] 
AfWt-1 
0.01 
[0.030] 
Azt 
1.09 
[0.000] 
H0: c(rw) = -c(pr) : Wald test [X2(l)] = 0.29; LL = 186.47. 
[0.593] 
SC[y2(l)]= 0.73; LIN[y2( l ) ]= 1.36; NOR[y2(2)]= 0.87; HET[y2( l) ]= 0.22; ARCH[y2(l)]= 0.00. 
[0.392] [0.243] [0.647] [0.636] [0.974] 
I ta ly , 1962-2008. 
cnt m-i Ant-i 1st rt campt-i 
nt = 1.29 0.95 0.29 -0.12 -0.14 0.02 
[0.085] [0.000] [0.037] [0.001] [0.002] [0.083] 
H0: c(rw) = -c(pr) : Wald test [y2(l)] = 2.50; LL = 160.45. 
[0.114] 
SC[y2(l)]= 0.21; LIN[y2( l ) ]= 0.68; NOR[y2(2)]= 0.75; HET[y2( l) ]= 1.84; ARCH[y2(l)]= 0.90. 
[0.650] [0.411] [0.686] [0.175] [0.343] 
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Table 4 (continued) 
J a p a n , 1961-2008. 
cnt nt-! 
nt = 0.66 0.92 
[0.271] [0.000] 
1st Arwt Aprt 
-0.06 -0 .24 0.10 
[0.046] [0.001] [0.094] 
rh-i t*!00 
0.03 -0 .18 
[0.001] [0.000] 
H0: c(rw) = -c(pr) : Wald test [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 0.02; LL = 181.85. 
[0.877] 
SC[y 2 ( l ) ]= 3.44; L I N [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 0.99; NOR[y2 (2) ]=2.34; H E T [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 0.98; ARCH[y 2 ( l ) ] = 0.02. 
[0.064] [0.321] [0.310] [0.322] [0.883] 
S p a i n , 1966-2008. 
cnt nt_x A n t _ ! An t_2 
nt = 2.74 0.95 0.64 -0 .29 [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.074] 
lst 
-0 .25 
[0.015] 
rwt Arwt Aprt Aprt-2 
-0 .05 -0 .26 - 0 . 3 4 -0 .26 
[0.007] [0.064] [0.031] [0.111] 
rt oik Aoik 
-0 .15 - 0 . 0 1 0.015 
[0.023] [0.015] [0.037] 
H0: c(rw) = 0 : Wald test [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 8.28; 
[0.004] 
LL = 140.92. 
SC[y 2 ( l ) ]= 2.03; L IN [y 2 ( l ) ] =2 .02 ; NOR[y2 (2) ]= 0.48; H E T [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 1.24; ARCH[y 2 ( l ) ] = 0.04. 
[0.154] [0.155] [0.785] [0.266] [0.838] 
U . K . , 1962-2008. 
cnt nt-! Ant-! lst Aprt-! 
nt = 3.71 0.82 0.54 -0 .20 0.29 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] 
ft ct 
-0 .13 0.28 
[0.019] [0.001] 
H0: c(rw) = -c(pr) : Wald test [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 0.16; LL = 166.03. 
[0.690] 
SC[y 2 ( l ) ]= 2.03; L I N [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 2 . 0 1 ; NOR[y2 (2) ]= 3.96; H E T [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 1.66; ARCH[y 2 ( l ) ] = 0.48. 
[0.154] [0.157] [0.138] [0.197] [0.491] 
U.S. , 1962-2008. 
cnt nt-! 1st rwt rbt 
nt = 1.98 0.91 -0 .20 -0 .12 0.08 
[0.028] [0.000] [0.076] [0.072] [0.065] 
Arbt Arbt-! 
-0 .16 0.18 
[0.010] [0.008] 
H0: c(rw) = 0 : Wald test [ y 2 ( l ) ]=3 .41 ; 
[0.65] 
LL = 152.62. 
SC[y 2 ( l ) ]=1.35; L I N [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 1.92; NOR[y2 (2) ]= 0.39; H E T [ y 2 ( l ) ] = 0.17; ARCH[y 2 ( l ) ] = 0.43. 
[0.244] [0.166] [0.822] [0.679] [0.512] 
Note: A denotes the difference operator; p-values in brackets. 
c{rw) and c(pr) are, respectively, the estimated coefficients on real wages and labour productivity. 
Furthermore, real interest rates, ru or real balances, rbt, w i t h the expected negative 
and positive effects, respectively, are among the determinants of labour demand capturing 
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the influence of monetary conditions on employment.19 These effects can be seen as 
evidence against the classical dichotomy of a vertical Phil l ips curve; for example, as Bal l 
and Mankiw (2002, p. 116) point out “belief that monetary policy has employment effects 
is inextr icably t ied to belief in the inflation-unemployment tradeoff.” 
Final ly note that our estimations identified as employment determinants (i) the ag-
gregate demand factors of financial wealth, fwt, and private consumption, Q , and (ii) the 
input price factors of oi l prices, oilu and competitiveness, compu al l w i t h the expected 
signs.20 
Tab le 5. L a b o u r i n c o m e share sens i t i v i t i es 
Japan France Italy Germany UK US Spain 
short-run 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.25 
long-run 0.75 1.0 1.1 1.2 2.2 2.4 5.0 
5 Employment Contributions of the Labour Share 
I n what follows we analyse the conceptual underpinnings of what we call contributions and 
present the empirical evidence of the contributions of the labour share to the employment 
trajectory. 
5.1 Dynamic Contributions: Conceptual Underpinnings 
One of the salient features of our dynamic modell ing approach is that we define an impulse, 
or "shock" as a one-off change in a specific exogenous variable. Defining the impulse 
(shock) as a change in an exogenous variable, rather than as a one-off change in the 
residuals of a behavioural equation,21 has a clear advantage: i t gives rise to ‘dynamic 
contributions’, a measure that shows how the endogenous variable of a dynamic equation 
responds to the actual changes in an exogenous variable over a sample interval. 
The most pedagogical i l lustrat ion of the concept of dynamic contributions can be given 
in the context of a simple AR(1) employment equation: 
nt = ant-! + fixt, where \a\ < 1. (28) 
The impulse response function ( IRF) of the stochastic process (28) to a one-off uni t change 
19
 Among other studies, Pissarides (1991) finds that the real interest rate and M3 have significant 
employment effects in the Australian labour market over the 1966-86 period. 
20The influence of aggregate demand and input price factors on employment is also a feature of the 
labour demand function in Manning (1993, equation (2)). 
21Blanchard (2009, p. 220) correctly points out that “The use of "shocks" is fraught wi th philosophical, 
but also with practical, difficulties: Technological shocks, animal spirits, changes in perceived uncertainty, 
etc. all have deeper causes, which themselves have even deeper causes, and so on.” 
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i n the exogenous variable xt is 
IRF of the AR(1): time 
responses 
t 
p 
t + l 
/3a 
t +2 
f3a2 
... 
... 
t+10 
f3a10 
... 
... 
(29) 
Note that a one-time uni t shock w i l l have an immediate uni tx /3 impact on employment, 
while the future effects of the shock decline in a geometric fashion. We can summarise 
the sensitivity of employment w i t h respect to variable x as: 
long-run sensitivity = short-run sensitivity + persistence (30) 
(3/(I-a) P [3a/ ( 1 - a) 
where employment persistence is defined as the sum of future responses (i.e. the responses 
in the aftermath of the shock), short-run sensitivity refers to the contemporaneous re-
sponse, and the long-run sensitivity is given by the sum of al l responses. 
On the basis of the above analysis, we measure the contributions of the exogenous 
variable x to the evolution of employment over a specific period of t ime , say t = 1 to 
t = T,by sequentially adding up the IRFs of the respective changes dur ing the specific 
period. Let Axd = xd x j - i , where j = 1 , 2, . . .T , and A is the first difference operator. 
The IRFs of these T shocks are: 
t = l t =2 
I R F i : Rn R12 
IRF 2 : 
I R F T : 
R22 
t = T 
RlT 
R2T 
RTT 
(31) 
where IRF^ denotes the response funct ion of employment to the j t h shock, and Rjt is the 
response to shock j in t ime t. Note that the diagonal elements in matr ix (31) denote the 
respective contemporaneous employment response to the j t h one-off shock, whereas the 
elements above the diagonal denote the employment responses in period t to the shocks 
which occurred in the past j periods. Therefore, the t-period contribution can be obtained 
as the sum of al l responses in this period. 
I n other words, the contributions of the exogenous variable x to the employment 
trajectory for the given interval are given by the following t ime series: 
t = \ t=2 t=3 
2 3 
Rn, Y,Rj2, T,Rj3, 
t = T 
T 
E RJT-
(32) 
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5.2 Empirical Contributions 
Al though sensitive to business cycle variations, employment is an overall growing variable. 
For all countries in our sample the number of jobs has generally grown across decades 
(there are only three exceptions - Spain in the 1970s, I ta ly in the 1990s, and Japan in 
the 2000s). I n contrast, the labour share has followed a downward path for the last three 
decades in every country w i t h just two exceptions - the U K in the eighties, and I ta ly in 
the noughties. The analysis in Section 3 and the empirical results in Section 4 show that 
the wage gap affects labour demand negatively. Put differently, the fal l ing labour shares 
led to higher employment levels. Below we explain how we can measure the employment 
contributions of the wage gap. 
For each of the seven countries in our sample, we examine the influence of the labour 
share on the employment trajectory over the periods 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000, 
and 2000-2008 by carrying out counterfactual simulations and applying the technique 
described in the previous section. We evaluate the contributions of the labour share by 
p lo t t ing the actual series of employment against its simulated series obtained by fixing 
- i n the estimations of Table 4 - the labour share at its value at the start of a specific 
period. The disparity between the actual and simulated series of employment measures 
the dynamic contr ibut ion of the wage gap to employment for the specific period. The 
actual changes in employment, and the employment contributions of the labour income 
share are given in Table 6, whereas the actual and simulated employment trajectories are 
portrayed in the second column of Figures A.2-8 in the Appendix (blue and red lines, 
respectively). Note that the actual and fixed values of the labour share are plot ted in the 
first column of Figures A.2-8 (blue and red lines, respectively). 
As an example consider France in the seventies. The question to be answered is “Had 
the labour share remained at 73.9%, i.e. at its 1970 value, what would have been the 
employment level in 1980?” The distance between the blue and red lines in Figure A.2a 
measures the cumulation of "shocks" experienced in each year; by 1980 the magnitude 
of the labour share shocks was 4.3 percentage points (Is |87 00= 4.3 pp in Table 6). I n 
tu rn , the distance between the blue and red lines in Figure A.2b measures the dynamic 
contributions of the labour share to the employment t ime path. I n this case we find that , 
because the labour share rose by 4.3 pp, the French economy failed to increase employment 
by 2 .1%, i.e. i t was unable to create 0.49 mi l l ion jobs out of 23.31 mill ions that would 
result i n the absence of the "shock" (i.e. we subtract the 1980 values of the blue and 
red lines in Figure A.2b: 22.8 - 23.31 = -0 .49 mill ions or =§§ = - 2 . 1 % ) . I n other 
words, the contr ibut ion of the change in the labour share to the employment trajectory 
dur ing the seventies is n |87 00= - 2 . 1 % (see also Table 6). To gauge the significance of this 
contr ibut ion, Table 6 also reports the actual increase in employment over the seventies, 
An7 0^80 = 6.5%. (Note that al l the information presented in Table 6 can be retrieved 
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from Figures A.2-8.) 
Table 6. Employment contributions of the labour income share 
1 9 7 0 s 
An70^80 
Is 
n\ 
180 
170 
80 
70 
France 
6.5% 
4.3 pp 
- 2 . 1 % 
(= -5or ) 
Germany 
3 . 1 % 
2.0 pp 
-2.4% 
Italy 
7.0% 
0.4 pp 
-2.4% 
Japan 
8.7% 
8.7 pp 
-5.3% 
Spain 
-3.9% 
(=-3MF) ( = - T § ) (=-
3.7% (=m) 
UK 
1.4% 
-0.4 pp -0.7 pp 
4.8% (=m 
US 
22.0% 
-2.2 pp 
3.4% 
1 9 8 0 s 
An80^90 
Is 
n\ 
190 
180 
90 
80 
2.0% 
-8.7 pp 
6.9% 
1.5 
21.63 
10.9% 
-6.0 pp 
6.9% 
1.4% 
-5.4 pp 
6.4% 
12.9% 
2.9% 
8.9% 
-7.6 pp -4.9 pp 
11.3% 
7 . 1 % 
0.5 pp 
-0.7% 
19.6% 
-2.8 pp 
(=*&) (=Mk) (=m {=m (=m (=- (=«) 
3.4% 
3.93 
114.87 
1 9 9 0 s 
An90^00 
Is 
n\ 
100 
190 
00 
90 
4.7% 
1.5% 
2.8% 
3.0% 
-0.7% 3.2% 19.6% 2.3% 
8.8% 0.3% 0.7% 7.6% 
15.2% 
-2.7pp -1.5pp -6.6pp -1.2pp -0.6pp -2.8pp -1.8 pp 
4 . 1 % (=m) (=m) (=^) {=m (=m) (=m) (=m,) 
2 0 0 0 s 
A 0 0 ^ 0 8 
Is 08 00 
7.0% 2.9% 10.9% 
-0.1 pp -3.8 pp 1.3 pp 
-0.9% 29.7% 7 .1% 6.2% 
-4.3pp -1.4pp -2.1pp -1.1 pp 
n\ 00 0.3% 4.7% - 1 . 1 % 2.4% 1.9% 2.6% ( = » (=m (=-t) (=M-S) (=Ws) (=m ( = « ) 
1.2% 
1.70 
Note: Anx^y and Is \yx denote, respectively, actual changes i n employment ( in %) and labour 
income shares ( in pp) between indicated dates, x and y; i n t u r n , n \yx denotes the cont r ibut ion 
i n tha t per iod ( in %, rat io i n mil l ions) of the labour income share to the evolut ion of employment. 
D u r i n g t h e 1970s, t he increase i n the l abou r share i n France, Germany , a n d I t a l y 
(Is |87 00 i n Tab le 6) c o n t r i b u t e d nega t i ve ly t o e m p l o y m e n t , be tween - 2 % a n d -2 .5%. T h i s 
resu l t suppor ts t he v i e w p o i n t o f B r u n o a n d Sachs (1985) t h a t t he excessive w a r r a n t e d 
wage v is-à-v is t he p r o d u c t i v i t y s l owdown was a n i m p o r t a n t fac to r o f t he u n e m p l o y m e n t 
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increase. This also seems to be especially true in Japan, where the relatively large increase 
in the labour share (8.7 pp) accounts for a 5.3% decrease in employment. I n contrast, i n 
Spain, the UK , and US the fal l i n the labour share had a significant positive contr ibut ion 
to employment. I t is wor th not ing that although the labour share fal l in Spain and the 
U K was just a small fraction of that i n the US, its employment contr ibut ion was larger 
than in the US. Specifically, in Spain, the relatively small fal l in the labour share was an 
important break to the employment decrease; in the absence of such a break, the rate of 
change in the reduction of employment would have been double its actual size. 
The picture changes dramatical ly in the eighties as al l countries (except the UK) 
experience large drops in their labour shares, about 2-3 times larger than the one in the 
US. I n Japan the abrupt change is dramatic w i t h the labour share moving f rom an 8.7 pp 
increase, the highest value in the sample, down to a 7.6 pp decrease f rom the 1970s to the 
1980s. Nevertheless, its employment contr ibut ion is disappointingly small when compared 
to that i n the US and the continental European countries. Also in sharp contrast to the 
seventies, the French labour share fell by 8.7 pp in the eighties, contr ibut ing 1.5 mi l l ion 
jobs or 6.9% more employment. 
A l l labour shares continued to fall in the roaring nineties. A l though France and the U K 
faced similar drops in their labour shares (-2.7 and -2.8 pp), the employment contr ibut ion 
in the U K is five times higher than the respective one in France. The highest value of 
the employment contr ibut ion relative to its labour share change (in absolute terms) is 
observed in the U K (7.6/2.8=2.7) followed by the ones in the US and Germany. I t is 
wor th point ing out that , while Germany and Japan experienced a similar slowdown in 
their fal l ing labour shares, the significant employment contr ibut ion in post unif ication 
Germany is starkly different f rom the minimal employment contr ibut ion witnessed in 
Japan dur ing its ‘lost decade’. 
Labour shares continued to fall well into the noughties in most countries; the exceptions 
are two countries of the Eurozone, I ta ly w i t h an increase and France w i t h a min imal fal l . 
I n particular, following the introduct ion of the euro, Germany experienced the largest 
drop among the E M U countries, a drop that was higher than that of the Anglo-Saxon 
economies. A l though Germany had the second largest reduction after Japan, i t witnessed 
the highest employment contr ibut ion w i t h a value of 4.7%, double the size of that i n 
Japan. Observe that this high value of the employment contr ibut ion is matched ( in 
relative terms) by Spain and the Anglo-Saxon economies: the employment contr ibut ion 
relative to the absolute value of its labour share change is 
Spain: ^ = >, Germany: ^ =
 L 2 , UK : ^ = 1 . 2 , US: ^ = 1 . 1 . 
According to our findings, the larger the decrease in the labour share the larger its 
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employment contribution. This can be clearly seen by plotting the changes in each coun-
try’s labour share per decade against their associated employment contributions. This 
scatter diagram is pictured in Figure 4, while the correlation coefficient between the two 
magnitudes is as high as -0.81.22 Note that most of the values corresponding to the eight-
ies (five out of seven countries) are towards the bottom-right end of the plot, indicating 
that this was the decade with the largest reductions in the labour share. In contrast, 
France, Germany, Italy, and especially Japan witnessed increases in their labour shares 
in the seventies; thus, datapoints F7, G7, I7, and J7 are towards the top-left end of the 
plot in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Changes in the labour share and employment contributions 
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6 Conclusions 
Whilst maintaining the classical assumption of a one-to-one relationship between real 
wages and productivity in the long run, this paper challenges the established view that 
the labour income share is innocuous to employment. 
First, using data for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the US from 
1960 to 2008 it is evident that, although widely assumed in the literature, the theoretical 
property of a constant labour share is strongly refuted by reality. 
Second, we argued that the familiar neoclassical world view, i.e. higher productivity 
is reflected fully in higher real wages, can only prevail in the absence of dynamics and 
22In terms of notation, the country is denoted by its first letter and the decade by its first number (e.g. 
J7 denotes Japan in the seventies). The UK is denoted by K, the US by U, and the 2000s by 0. 
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growth. The analytical exposition in Section 3 showed that the introduction of dynamics 
into wage setting distorts this neoclassical wisdom in the short run, while the presence of 
both wage dynamics and growth rejects it in the long run. In particular, we demonstrated 
that the interplay of lags and growth, what we call frictional growth, accounts for the 
disparity between the steady-state wage setting and its long-run state. Put differently, 
the wage-productivity gap does not vanish in the long run; instead, it is equal to frictional 
growth. Furthermore, we showed that an implication of frictional growth is that the wage-
productivity gap has an influential role in employment dynamics at all time horizons. 
Third, we estimated wage setting and labour demand equations for each of the seven 
countries in our sample and found that the labour share (or wage-productivity gap) affects 
negatively employment. Ranking the countries according to the size of the impact of the 
labour share on employment we noted that Japan is at the low end of the spectrum, 
followed closely by Europe’s largest economies (France, Germany, and UK), while Spain 
is at the top of the ranking with a value approximately five times higher. The US is right 
at the middle with a sensitivity of employment to the labour share double the size of that 
in the UK, and half the size of that in Spain. 
Finally, we evaluated the contributions of the labour share to the evolution of employ-
ment over the seventies, eighties, nineties, and the naughties by carrying out counterfac-
tual simulations. During the 1970s, the increase in the labour share in France, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan contributed negatively to their employment levels. This result is in line 
with the once prominent viewpoint that the excessive warranted wage vis-à-vis the pro-
ductivity slowdown was an important factor of the unemployment increase. However, this 
picture changed dramatically in the 1980s; almost all countries experienced large drops 
in their labour shares, contributing positively to employment. The same pattern charac-
terised the 1990s and the 2000s: wages continued to trail productivity (i.e. the labour 
share continued to fall), and this promoted employment gains. 
As our findings clearly indicate that the larger the decrease in the labour share the 
larger its employment boost, the evolution of the wage-productivity gap should play an 
instrumental role in policy making. As far as policy making is concerned, it is worth 
recording that a bird’s eye view of academic and press articles highlight the surge in 
income inequality over the recent decades. Although an investigation of the apparent 
association of the falling labour share with the increasing inequality was beyond the scope 
of this paper, we endeavour to address the globalised employment/income inequality mix 
in future work. 
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Appendix 
Table A .1 Testing the long-run relationships in the Johansen framework 
Fr a n c e 
Germany24 
Italy 
Japan 
Spain 
UK 
US 
Note: p-values 
A R D L 2 3 
( n rw pr ) 
( 1 -1.00 1.00 ) 
( 1 -1.22 1.22 ) 
( 1 -2.42 2.42 ) 
( 1 -0.75 0.75 ) 
( 1 -4.60 4.60 ) 
( 1 -1.00 1.00 ) 
( 1 -2.09 2.09 ) 
Johansen 
( n rw pr ) 
( 1 -0.19 0.39 ) 
( 1 -1.40 1.54 ) 
( 1 -1.71 2.31 ) 
( 1 0.37 -1.40 ) 
( 1 -4.66 4.49 ) 
( 1 -0.77 0.81 ) 
( 1 0.26 -1.39 ) 
in square brackets; 5% critical values: %2(2) = 5.99 
L R test 
X2(2)=2.19[0.334] 
x
2(3)=5.46[0.141] 
X2 (2) =4.76[0.093] 
X2(2)=3.94[0.140] 
X2 (2) =0.40[0.817] 
X2(2)=0.75[0.688] 
X2 (2) =5.70[0.058] 
; X2(3) = 7.82. 
23
 Any dicrepancies between these values and those in Table 5 are due to rounding up. 
24Since financial wealth is I (1), i t is included as a fourth variable in the cointegrating vector and, thus, 
the LR test follows a
 X
2
 (3) distribution. Also note that the long-run coefficient of financial wealth is 0.15 
when the ARDL approach is used, and 0.16 according to the Johansen procedure. 
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Figure A.5 Japan 
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Figure A.6 Spain 
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Figure A.8 US 
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